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Abstract
Welfare reform has been central to UK government policy since
2010. This article compares initial expectations with key outcomes
by 2016. The article shows that although the financial savings to
the Treasury have been large, they have been rather less than the
government first anticipated, mainly because the reduction in spend-
ing on incapacity‐related benefits has proved far smaller than
expected. The financial losses have also been spread highly unevenly
across the country, and the evidence from a pilot study in Scotland
suggests that the reforms have had little impact on levels of work-
lessness. The article concludes that whilst forecasting the financial
savings from welfare reform is an inherently uncertain activity, the
United Kingdom's reforms should be understood first and foremost
as about reducing public spending in the poorest places.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Welfare reform has become a defining feature of contemporary UK government policy. The 1997–2010 Labour
Government initiated a number of important changes, but the pace of reform quickened dramatically following the
election of its Conservative‐led coalition successor, when reducing spending on welfare benefits became central to
the Government's economic strategy. The wholly Conservative Government elected in May 2015 (and re‐elected in
June 2017, but without an overall majority) has maintained the momentum with a further round of welfare reforms.
This article examines the welfare reforms implemented in the United Kingdom between 2010 and 2015, tracing
their impact through to 2016. It looks specifically at whether the expectations placed on the reforms have been
matched by the outcomes. The focus is on three impacts. First, the article looks at the extent to which the financial
savings anticipated by the Treasury have, in practice, been delivered. Second, the article looks at the distribution of
the financial losses between local areas across the country. Third, the article examines the impact of the welfare
reforms on key labor market variables.
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The article draws on quantitative data assembled in a number of studies by the authors. Many of the figures in the
report are estimates, but in every case they are deeply rooted in official statistics—for example, in theTreasury's own
estimates of the financial savings, the government's Impact Assessments, and benefit claimant data.
Welfare reform is a contentious issue. Throughout the period since 2010 the dominant motivation of government
has been to reduce the United Kingdom's budget deficit, but an ideological agenda that is based on the need to reduce
welfare dependency and incentivize paid employment has also been central to the aims of the reforms. This has
contributed to political, policy, and contemporary debates which have sought to stigmatize those in receipt of
benefits, blame individuals for their predicament, and ignore the structural factors at play. In documenting the impacts,
the article does not attempt to comment on the merits of the overall strategy or of each of the reforms. Nor is it possible
in a short article to examine all the impacts of the reforms, including for example the financial losses to different income
groups and household types. The article does, however, make no apology for considering the impact on different places
because this is a dimension that is too often overlooked, and is a key tool in monitoring labor market impacts.
2 | THE WELFARE REFORMS
The tenmajor welfare reforms implemented in the United Kingdom between 2010 and 2015 and covered by this article are:
• Housing Benefit—Local Housing Allowance
Changes to the rules governing assistance with the cost of housing for low‐income households in the private
rented sector.
• Housing Benefit—under‐occupation in the social rented sector
New rules governing the size of properties for which payments are made to working‐age claimants (widely known
and also referred to in this article as the “bedroom tax”).
• Non‐dependant deductions
Increases in the deductions from income‐based benefits to reflect the contribution that non‐dependant house-
hold members are expected to make towards the household's housing costs.
• Benefit Cap
A new ceiling on total payments per household, applying to the sum of a wide range of benefits for out‐of‐work
claimants of working age.
• Council Tax Support
Reductions in the entitlement of working age claimants arising from a 10% reduction in total payments to local
authorities.
• Personal Independence Payment
Phased replacement of Disability Living Allowance (DLA) by Personal Independence Payment (PIP) for working‐
age claimants, including more stringent and frequent medical tests.
• Employment and Support Allowance
Replacement of Incapacity Benefit (IB) and related benefits by Employment and Support Allowance (ESA), with
more stringent medical tests, greater conditionality, and time‐limiting of non‐means tested entitlement for
claimants in the Work‐Related Activity Group.
• Child Benefit
Three‐year freeze and withdrawal of benefit from households with a higher earner.
• Tax Credits
Reductions in payment rates and eligibility for Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credit paid to lower and middle
income households, including increase in working hours requirement for Working Tax Credit.
• 1% up‐rating
Limit in annual up‐rating of value, for three years for most working‐age benefits and for two years for Child
Benefit and the Local Housing Allowance element of Housing Benefit.
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A fuller description of each of the reforms, including the timing of implementation, is included in the Appendix.
The majority of these reforms were initiated by the Conservative‐led coalition Government, but the introduction of
ESA was a Labour measure that pre‐dated 2010 and only took full effect later, whereas the time‐limiting of
non‐means‐tested ESA entitlement was a coalition innovation. The full impact of both the introduction and
time‐limiting of ESA is included here to provide a comprehensive view of the impact of the reforms implemented from
2010 onwards. By March 2016, nearly all these reforms had come into full effect. The important exception is the
changeover from DLA to PIP, which the government does not expect to be completed until at least 2018.
An astute observer will note the omission of Universal Credit, which is scheduled to replace just about all
means‐tested working‐age benefits, and is administratively the most ambitious welfare reform of all. However, the
introduction of Universal Credit differs from the other reforms listed here. Universal Credit is best understood as a
repackaging of existing benefits that for the first time introduces a consistent withdrawal rate, with the rules
governing eligibility carried over from the existing benefits it replaces (Department for Work and Pensions, 2010).
In the original plan, Universal Credit modified the exact value of the entitlement of most individuals and households,
but was intended to reduce overall spending only by making it financially worthwhile to move into work. In practice,
revisions to the “Work Allowances” within Universal Credit, announced in July 2015 to take effect for new claimants
from April 2016, mean that for many individuals and households Universal Credit will now be paid at a lower rate than
the benefits it replaces. More importantly in the present context, the introduction of Universal Credit has proved slow.
By March 2016, there were only 230,000 Universal Credit claims, nearly all unemployed single people.
The list of welfare reforms also omits benefit sanctions. What needs to be remembered here is that the power to
impose benefit sanctions is not new.What happened after 2010 is that sanctions were more widely applied, especially
to those claiming Jobseeker's Allowance (JSA), although the numbers and the rate now appear to have peaked
(Webster, 2016). The National Audit Office (2016) estimated that during 2015 the application of sanctions reduced
welfare spending by £97 million. A further omission from the list is Income Support for lone parents. The qualifying
age of the youngest child was reduced in 2011 from under seven to under five, but the effect is to transfer the lone
parent onto JSA at the same payment rate.
The list also excludes the changeover from RPI to CPI1 for benefits uprating, which was introduced in 2011 but is
part of a much wider accounting reform, including for example all public sector pensions. In contrast to theTreasury,
we have therefore refrained from adding the impact of this particular changeover to the list of savings to the
Exchequer (and losses to claimants) arising specifically from welfare reform. Additionally, the RPI to CPI changeover
was superseded for most working‐age benefits by the 1% uprating cap introduced in 2013.2
3 | THE EXISTING EVIDENCE BASE
Much of the previous research on the United Kingdom's welfare reforms has focused on the impact on particular groups
or the impact of individual measures. Distributional analyses have found that those in the lowest income decile have been
affected most, even when positive changes in tax allowances and the minimum wage are taken into consideration (Finch
& Whittaker, 2016; Hood & Johnson, 2016). Analyses by gender highlight the disproportionate impact on women
(MacLeavy, 2011; Scottish Government, 2013). Families with dependent children are also hit hard (Browne & Elming,
2015). Unsurprisingly, research confirms that, in most cases, the reforms increase the financial incentive to work (Adams
& Browne, 2013; Hirsch & Beckhelling, 2011). The UK government's Social Security Advisory Committee (2014)
reviewed the evidence on the cumulative impact of the reforms, but not in a systematic, quantitative way
Turning to the impact of individual measures, there has been extensive research into the impact of the reforms to
HousingBenefit. This includes the impact on landlords and tenants in the social rented sector (Power, Provan,Herden, &
Serle, 2014; Williams, Clarke, & Whitehead, 2013) and in the private rented sector (Beatty et al., 2014), notably in
London and amongst young single people (Beatty, Cole, Foden, & Powell, 2014). Specific attention has also been paid
to the impacts of the “bedroom tax” (Clarke et al., 2015) and theBenefit Cap (Department forWork andPensions, 2014).
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The anticipated impact of thewelfare reforms on local areas across the country was initially documented by Beatty
and Fothergill (2013), and subsequently by Wilson, Morgan, Rahman, and Lovedeep (2013). Both studies pointed
toward larger financial losses in poorer areas and in the parts of London hit hard by theHousingBenefit reforms. Figures
for Wales (Welsh Government, 2014) confirmed the impact on poorer areas. Studies in Scotland (Beatty & Fothergill,
2014a) and in Sheffield (Beatty & Fothergill, 2015) drove down the estimated impacts to neighborhood level.
In contrast, the potential divergence between expectations and outturns has so far received little attention. The
UK government itself has steered clear of looking back at how its welfare reforms are matching up to expectations. It
publishes forecast savings when policy changes are first announced, and from time to time it publishes revised
forecasts, but setting one against the other is not normal practice.
The figures published by Beatty and Fothergill (2016), which are the starting point for the present article, were
the first to compare expectations and outcomes across the package as a whole. The Institute for Fiscal Studies
(Emmerson, Johnson, & Joyce, 2017) subsequently argued that, by 2015–16, welfare spending in the United Kingdom
was lower than it would have been otherwise, but shared Beatty and Fothergill's assessment that the savings have
been less than expected. The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR)—the official watchdog on Treasury spending
and forecasts—also subsequently published estimates of the reductions in welfare spending through to 2015–16 that
differ in detail, but not in the broader conclusions (OBR, 2016).
4 | THE FINANCIAL LOSS TO CLAIMANTS
Table 1 shows the annual financial loss to claimants, by March 2016, arising from each element of the welfare reforms
listed above. Details of the data sources and methods are included in the Appendix, and set out in greater detail in
Beatty and Fothergill (2016).
The first column shows the financial losses to claimants originally anticipated. These are taken from Beatty and
Fothergill (2013, 2014b), and are mostly theTreasury's own figures, published when the reforms were first announced.
TheTreasury's initial forecasts were generally for financial savings through to 2014–15. The initial forecasts have there-
fore been adjustedwhere further increases in the number of affected claimantswere anticipated by 2016 (e.g., from the
ESA reforms) and where it became clear that there would be a divergence between the savings to theTreasury and the
loss to claimants (e.g., in Council Tax Support). The initial forecasts have also been adjusted to reflect exemptions or
modifications (e.g., to the withdrawal of Child Benefit from higher earners) announced prior to implementation.
TABLE 1 Estimated annual financial loss arising from welfare reform by March 2016
Initial forecast
£m p.a.
Estimated outturn
£m p.a.
Tax Credits 3,660 4,210
Child Benefit 2,845 3,030
1% uprating 3,430 2,700
Housing Benefit: Local Housing Allowance 1,645 1,670
Personal Independence Payment 1,450 1,190
Employment and Support Allowance 4,350 650
Council Tax Support 340 370
Housing Benefit: “bedroom tax” 490 360
Non‐dependant deductions 340 210
Benefit Cap 270 100
Total 18,820 14,490
Source. HM Treasury and authors' estimates based on official data.
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The second column shows the annual losses to claimants estimated to have arisen by March 2016. In several
cases these are the Treasury's most recent published estimates, taken from subsequent Budgets and Autumn
Statements. TheseTreasury figures are all revised forecasts rather than outturn savings, and necessarily, therefore, still
subject to a margin of error. In a number of other cases the losses have been estimated using outturn data, for
example, on the number of ESA claimants, on the numbers affected by the Benefit Cap and the “bedroom tax”, and
(in the context of up‐rating) on the outturn rate of inflation.
4.1 | Overall losses
There are important differences between what was originally anticipated and what by March 2016 had proved to be
the outturn. At just under £14.5 billion a year, the loss to welfare claimants is very large, but down on the original
forecast. Overall, the loss to claimants by March 2016 is estimated to have been £4.3 billion a year less than forecast.
The subsequent estimates by the OBR (2016) confirm the magnitude of the outturn loss to claimants. It is difficult to
draw precise comparisons with the figures in Table 1 because there are differences in methods and scope. However,
the OBR estimates that the reduction in spending on working‐age welfare and on child benefits sums to £18.1 billion
a year by 2015–16. Deducting the impact of the changeover to CPI for uprating (an estimated £4.2 billion a year
excluding the impact on the second state pension) and adding back in the £370 million a year reduction attributable
to Council Tax Support (which the OBR excludes as a local scheme) brings to OBR outturn figure to £14.3 billion a
year, quite close to the total in Table 1. The omission of the changeover to CPI for uprating also accounts for most
of the divergence from the £16.7 billion estimate published by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (Emmerson et al., 2017).
Two of the reforms have delivered bigger savings to the Treasury than the loss to claimants. In Scotland and
Wales, the reduction in Council Tax Support has not been passed on to claimants, and in some English local authorities
as well the reduction has not been passed on in full or in part. This has reduced the loss to claimants by £120 million a
year.3 In Scotland, the impact of the “bedroom tax” has been fully averted using Discretionary Housing Payments—a
saving to claimants of around £50 million a year.4 In both cases, the reduction in welfare spending by theTreasury has
resulted in reductions in other budgets within the devolved administrations and/or local authorities.
What is also apparent fromTable 1 is that the biggest financial losses to claimants have not been those that have
attracted the greatest publicity or controversy. Arguably, the “bedroom tax” and the Benefit Cap are the two
post‐2010 welfare reforms that have generated greatest attention, partly because they were entirely new and partly
because they have resulted in substantial losses for specific households. But in the overall jigsaw of welfare reform
they account for relatively modest sums—£360 million and £100 million a year, respectively. The big reductions have
arisen from changes to Tax Credits (£4,210 million a year), Child Benefit (£3,030 million) and the 1% uprating
(£2,700 million), all of which have affected very large numbers of individuals and households.
4.2 | Employment and Support Allowance
The reduction in spending on incapacity‐related benefits—these days, ESA—accounts for by far the largest shortfall
between expectations and outturn. The original estimated loss to incapacity claimants of £4,350 million a year was
the largest single reduction in welfare spending and comprised two elements—an estimated £2,600 million a year
reduction in spending due to the extension of means testing and a further £1,750 million a year arising from the
measures initiated by the pre‐2010 Labour Government. The Treasury never published forecasts of the financial
losses arising from the pre‐2010 Labour measures, so these were estimated on the basis of the numbers expected
to be affected. In practice, the outturn financial loss to claimants arising from the reforms to incapacity‐related
benefits is estimated to be £650 million a year, far below what was originally expected. The OBR (2016) confirms this
assessment. It estimated that the changeover to ESA reduced spending by £400 million a year by 2015–16 and the
introduction of means‐testing by just £200 million a year—a very similar combined total.
Four factors appear to explain why the savings to the Treasury arising from the reform of incapacity‐related
benefits have fallen so far short of expectations. First, the new medical test (the Work Capability Assessment) has
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reduced incapacity numbers by far less than was anticipated, in part because following sustained criticism the test
itself has undergone successive revisions. By March 2016, the headline number of incapacity claimants was only down
on the 2010 level by around 100,000 (at 2.5 million).
Second, following the medical test a much smaller proportion of ESA claimants have been placed in the
“Work‐Related Activity Group” than was originally expected. Instead, a higher proportion have been placed in the
“Support Group”, intended for those with higher levels of ill‐health or disability, which attracts a higher payment rate.
Again, this may be attributable in part to revisions to the Work Capability Assessment.
Third, because the numbers in the Work‐Related Activity Group are much smaller than the government first
anticipated, the savings to theTreasury arising from the time‐limiting of non‐means‐tested entitlement, which applies
only to this group, have been much less than expected.
Fourth, and lastly, the government may simply have got its original figures wrong. Between the Spending Review
in October 2010 and the Budget in March 2012, the Treasury revised down the anticipated savings arising from the
extension of means‐testing by around £1 billion a year. This may be because the original calculations failed to take
account of off‐setting increases in spending on other means‐tested benefits, such as Housing Benefit, that would
follow as a consequence of reductions in ESA entitlement.
4.3 | Other divergences
Four other divergences between expectations and outturns are worth highlighting. First, the financial loss to claimants
arising from the introduction of the Benefit Cap proved less than expected—£100 million a year by March 2016
compared to an initial Treasury forecast of £270 million a year. This is mainly because fewer than expected house-
holds were affected by the cap—an average of just 28,000 between November 2013 and April 2014.5 There may
be evidence here of behavioral change: faced with a reduction in benefits, some households may have moved into
work or reported a change in circumstances. If this has not led to other offsetting welfare claims, for example by
displacing someone else onto benefits, theTreasury may in practice have made greater savings than the financial loss
to claimants.
Second, the 1%uprating of benefits did not lead to quite the savings theTreasury expected. This is because the annual
rate of inflation fell bymore than expected so that, in the absence of the 1% limit, benefits would not have been uprated by
a great deal more. Indeed, by the final year in which the 1% uprating applied the inflation rate was actually below 1%.
Third, the reduction in Tax Credits delivered greater savings than expected—£550 million a year more by March
2016. The initial forecast and the outturn are both theTreasury's own figures. What the increase would suggest is that
higher employment, the slow growth of earnings and the spread of low pay, all of which characterized the United
Kingdom's recovery from recession, increased the number of households affected by reductions in Tax Credits.
Fourth, the introduction of PIP has so far failed to deliver the scale of savings to theTreasury that the government
initially expected. Indeed, figures subsequently published by the OBR (2016) indicate that this element of the welfare
reform package is actually much further off track than the figures presented here suggest. The OBR notes that, by
2015–16, 75% of the working‐age caseload remained on PIP's predecessor, DLA, and the savings to the Treasury
among those moved to PIP were only around 5% compared to an initially anticipated 20%. As a result, the OBR
estimated that in 2015–16 the reduction in spending associated with the introduction of PIP was as little as
£100 million a year, and that only a fraction of the originally expected savings to the Treasury will be realized
as the new benefit is gradually rolled out in the second half of the decade.
5 | THE FINANCIAL LOSS TO LOCAL AREAS
Although from time to time the UK government has published local and regional data on individual elements of its
welfare reform package, it has never produced estimates of the overall local impact. It is to be expected, however, that
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the financial losses will vary from place to place, not least because benefit claimants are so unevenly spread across the
country. Official statistics do, however, allow the local impact to be estimated. These include the Impact Assessments
the government publishes for most elements of the reforms and the claimant numbers and expenditures, by local
authority, published by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) and Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs
(HMRC).
Figure 1 shows the estimated financial loss, by local authority across Britain, in March 2016. In order to compare
the impact on different places this map shows the annual financial loss per adult of working age. This is the best
FIGURE 1 Estimated loss arising from welfare reform by March 2016, by district [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Source. Authors' estimates based on official data.
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measure of the intensity of the “hit” in each area and is different to the loss facing each affected individual or
household because it also reflects the number of claimants and non‐claimants in each area. The focus on adults of
working age (16–64) is appropriate because the welfare reforms impact almost exclusively on this group and, by
contrast, benefit claimants of pensionable age are largely unaffected. The methods underpinning the local estimates
are set out in the Appendix, and maps on the impact of each of the individual reforms can be found in Beatty and
Fothergill (2016).
The overall impact by March 2016 presents a seemingly complex picture, but there are clear patterns. Three types
of area have been hit hardest:
• The older industrial areas of England, Scotland and Wales. These include substantial parts of North West and North
East England, Yorkshire, the South Wales Valleys and the Glasgow area in Scotland. Older industrial areas tend to
have high numbers on out‐of‐work benefits and on low wages, which triggersTax Credits and Housing Benefit as
income top‐ups.
• A number of less prosperous seaside towns. These too often have high numbers on out‐of‐work benefits and on low
wages, and a large private‐rented housing market which Housing Benefit reforms have hit hard.
• Some London boroughs. Some of these are also relatively deprived, but exceptionally high housing costs have
inflated the losses arising from Housing Benefit reforms in the private‐rented sector.
At the other end of the spectrum, a substantial part of southern England outside London has been much less
acutely affected by the reforms. A number of rural areas in northern England, including most of North Yorkshire
and parts of Cumbria, plus the Aberdeen area in Scotland, also escaped relatively lightly.
Table 2 lists the local authorities with the largest and smallest financial losses, per adult of working age, up to
March 2016. At the top of the list comes Blackpool, the famous seaside resort in North West England, where the
average loss per working age adult is estimated to be £720 a year. Blackpool tops the list for a number of reasons.
It has a high proportion of adults of working age out‐of‐work on benefits, including one of the highest incapacity
claimant rates in the country. It also has a high proportion of households living in the private‐rented sector, who have
been badly exposed to the reductions in the Local Housing Allowance element of Housing Benefit, and low wages in
the local economy have inflated the numbers hit by reductions inTax Credits. Westminster, at number two on the list,
has been hard hit because extremely high rents mean that, more than anywhere else in Britain, the Housing Benefit
reforms and the Benefit Cap have led to exceptionally large financial losses for some households.
TABLE 2 Estimated financial loss arising from welfare reform by March 2016
Loss per working
age adult £ p.a.
Loss per working
age adult £ p.a.
Top ten districts Bottom ten districts
Blackpool 720 South Oxfordshire 220
Westminster 680 Winchester 220
Knowsley 560 South Northamptonshire 220
Brent 550 Wokingham 210
Middlesbrough 550 Aberdeenshire 210
Hastings 540 Guildford 210
Barking and Dagenham 540 Hart 210
Torbay 530 Aberdeen 210
Enfield 530 Shetland 200
Hartlepool 520 Cambridge 190
Source. Authors' estimates based on official data.
8 BEATTY AND FOTHERGILL
Nevertheless, in all the worst affected local authorities the financial losses by March 2016 are less than first
anticipated (Beatty & Fothergill, 2013, 2014b), often by £150–£200 per adult of working age. This is principally
because the reduction in ESA numbers and spending has been far less than expected. The reforms to incapacity‐
related benefits were always going to cause the largest financial losses in the places where incapacity claimants are
concentrated. These are principally Britain's older industrial areas, where a diversion from unemployment to disability
benefits has for many years hidden the true scale of worklessness (Beatty & Fothergill, 2005). In the South Wales
Valleys, in particular, the “failure” of the incapacity‐related benefits reforms eased the financial losses by around
£200 per working‐age adult.
The worst affected districts have nevertheless still experienced losses that are typically two‐and‐a‐half to three
times higher, per adult of working age, than the least affected districts. The “failure” of the incapacity reforms has
mattered less in the latter because the claimant rate there has always been relatively low. Of the ten districts least
affected by the welfare reforms up to March 2016, seven are in the prosperous south and east of England outside
London, and the remaining three are in the parts of Scotland that benefit strongly from the oil industry.
6 | IMPACT ON THE LABOR MARKET
Welfare reform can be expected to influence labor market behavior by changing financial incentives. For an
unemployed person, a reduction in the value of out‐of‐work benefits increases the incentive to work. For a person
in work who receives benefits or tax credits, a reduction increases the incentive to take on extra hours or to find
higher paid work in order to maintain their income. The UK government has been quite explicit that its welfare
reforms are intended to encourage claimants to move off benefits and into work (HM Treasury, 2010).
But not all welfare reforms work in this way. A reduction in Working Tax Credits, for example, can actually make
taking a job financially less attractive. The scale of the financial incentive also varies a great deal. The loss of
entitlement to non‐means tested incapacity benefit (ESA) can be worth £5,000 a year, whereas the three‐year freeze
in the value of Child Benefit had a far smaller impact, around £100 a year.More significantly, the idea that welfare reform
will trigger additional employment is rooted in a particular view of how an economy works. It assumes that extra labor
supply will lead to additional labor demand—that firms will expand to take on the extra workers. At times and in places
where an economy is operating at or close to full employment, this argument has some validity. At times of recession, or
in places where there is a substantial surplus of labor—a fair description ofmany of Britain's weaker local economies—the
notion that extra labor supply will be smoothly absorbed by additional labor demand is more problematic.
Whether in practice welfare reform leads to lower numbers on benefit and higher numbers in work is therefore
essentially an empirical question. The complication is that welfare reform is only one of several things happening
simultaneously. In the United Kingdom, economic growth accelerated from mid‐2012 onwards after a period of
stagnation in the wake of the 2008/09 recession, at much the same time as several of the welfare reforms took effect.
Compared with 2012, employment is now higher and unemployment lower. However, it would be wrong to assume
that these improvements can be attributed in whole or in part to welfare reform. Benefit changes may (or may not)
have played a role, but other factors such as a revival of consumer spending and borrowing, particularly around the
housing market, have also contributed to the upturn.
The big variations from place to place in the scale of the financial losses (see Figure 1) do, however, offer a way
forward. Because the United Kingdom's welfare reforms impact so much more in some places than others, if there is a
positive impact on the labor market it should be much greater in these places. In each individual town or district, local
factors will of course help to shape local benefit numbers—the closure of a major employer for example, or improve-
ments in transport links to a neighboring center of employment. However, by pooling data from a number of places it
should be possible to begin to detect the impact of welfare reform. If welfare reform is an important factor, we should
expect to observe bigger reductions in benefit numbers, and bigger increases in employment, in the places where the
financial losses arising from welfare reform are greatest.
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In a pilot study in Scotland, commissioned by the Scottish Parliament, we explored these relationships
(Beatty, Fothergill, & Houston, 2015). In Scotland, as in the rest of Britain, there are big differences between local
authorities in the financial loss per adult of working age. At the extremes, by March 2016 the estimated annual
loss in Glasgow (£410 per adult of working age) is double the loss in Aberdeen (£210) or Shetland (£200). If the
welfare reforms are having an important impact on labor market outcomes, it should be possible to observe a
greater impact in Glasgow and other hard‐hit places than in Aberdeen, Shetland and other places escaping relatively
lightly. The analysis presented below updates the Scottish pilot study, taking on board the new figures on the
outturn financial losses by local authority through to March 2016 and bringing the labor market data forward in
time as well.
It is appropriate to begin by looking at the relationship between welfare reform and the out‐of‐work benefit
claimant rate. Changes in the out‐of‐work benefit claimant rate will reflect revisions to the rules governing entitle-
ment, which since 2010 have applied to incapacity‐related claims in particular, though with a rather smaller impact
on the headline total than was originally anticipated, as we noted earlier. The out‐of‐work benefit claimant rate should
also reflect moves into work prompted by the new financial incentives created by the welfare reforms. It will also, of
course, reflect wider trends in the national and local economy.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the average financial loss per adult of working age arising from
welfare reform (on the horizontal axis) and the percentage point change in the out‐of‐work benefit claimant
(on the vertical axis) by local authority in Scotland between February 2011 and May 2016. This period begins just
before the first of the UK government's reforms came into effect and finishes with the latest available benefit data.
“Out‐of‐work benefits” is a standard DWP category comprising all those on JSA, IB/ESA and Income Support as a
lone parent.
It is immediately obvious from Figure 2 that there is a relationship between the impact of welfare reform and
the fall in the out‐of‐work claimant rate: the bigger the financial loss arising from welfare reform, the bigger the fall
in the claimant rate. Very broadly, in the Scottish local authorities where welfare reform has hit hardest the fall in
the claimant rate has been 3–4 percentage points, compared to around 1–2 percentage points where welfare reform
has impacted less.
Figure 3 disaggregates the change in the out‐of‐work claimant rate into its two largest components—the change
in the JSA claimant rate6 and the change in the IB/ESA claimant rate. This highlights an important difference: the
relationship between the change in the benefit claimant rate and the impact of welfare reform applies to JSA, but
FIGURE 2 Relationship between financial loss arising from welfare reform and out‐of‐work benefit claimant rate,
Scottish local authorities, February 2011 to May 2016 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Source. DWP and authors' estimates based on official data.
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not to ESA. Indeed, ESA claimant rates have hardly fallen at all in Scotland (or, indeed, elsewhere in the
United Kingdom). The reductions in the ESA claimant rate have been no larger in the local authorities where welfare
reforms have hit hardest.
That all the fall has been in JSA rather than ESA numbers is in some respects surprising. The welfare reforms have
not in themselves reduced entitlement to JSA, though the tougher stance by Jobcentre Plus on sanctions may have
had this effect, and many JSA claimants will have experienced a reduction in Housing Benefit and/or tax credits.
The Work Capability Assessment, in contrast, was intended to make access to ESA more difficult for new claimants
and to disqualify some former claimants, and the wider application of means‐testing to make ESA less generous.
The financial losses attributable to ESA are also substantial—an estimated £85 million a year in Scotland by
March 2016.
The potential impacts on economic activity rates and employment rates are harder to monitor because, unlike the
benefits data, which is an administrative count, the local authority data beyond 2011 comes from a sample survey and
is subject to an important margin of error. The data on the number of jobs in each authority, from the Business
FIGURE 3 Relationship between financial loss arising from welfare reform and JSA and ESA claimant rates, Scottish
local authorities, February 2011 to May 2016 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Source. DWP and authors' estimates based on official data.
*Includes pre‐ESA incapacity‐related benefits.
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Register and Employment Survey (BRES) is more reliable though still affected by errors and discontinuities. Figure 4
shows the absence of a relationship between the change in the number of employee jobs in each Scottish local
authority (from BRES) and the financial losses arising from welfare reform.
Labor market trends in Scotland, at least, therefore provide only limited evidence that welfare reform is an
important causal factor. The important exception concerns the trend in JSA claimant numbers, which in turn
underpins the trend in overall out‐of‐work claimant numbers. The reduction in JSA numbers is higher in the places
where the financial loss from welfare reform is larger. This could be interpreted as evidence that, for JSA claimants
at least, welfare reform is working.
The problem with this interpretation is that when unemployment falls during an economic upturn it generally
does so more in some places than others, irrespective of welfare reform. In particular, it is always likely that in an
upturn the reduction will be greater in the places with initially high unemployment than in more prosperous, low
unemployment areas. This is partly because a reduction of, say, 4 percentage points is possible where the unemploy-
ment rate starts at 8%, but not where the rate starts at just 3% or 4%. The point here is that economic upturns are
normally associated with convergence in unemployment rates and the high unemployment areas are the ones most
affected by welfare reform. The more rapid fall in JSA numbers that can be observed in the areas hit hardest by
welfare reform may, in practice, have little to do with welfare reform.
Two upturns are never exactly the same, so finding the perfect match for the recent post‐recession period is
impossible. Figure 5 therefore compares the reduction in the JSA claimant rate between February 2011 and
May 2016 (taken from Figure 3) with two other periods when there was a similar percentage point fall in claimant
count unemployment in Scotland:
• February 1998 to November 2004. This is a rather longer period but one in which claimant unemployment fell from
broadly similar levels and by similar amounts, though unemployment was already well down on peak levels in the
early 1990s.7
• August 1993 to August 1996. This is a more comparable period in the economic cycle, covering the immediate
recovery from recession, but one in which claimant unemployment was falling from a far higher starting point.
Unemployment Benefit had also not yet been replaced by JSA, with its significantly more restrictive entitlement
for claimants of more than six months.
To maintain comparability, the horizontal axis on all three diagrams—the financial loss arising from the welfare
reforms by March 2016—is held constant. Left to right, each Scottish local authority is therefore at the same place
FIGURE 4 Relationship between financial loss arising from welfare reform and growth in employment, Scottish local
authorities, late 2010 to late 2015 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Source. BRES and authors' estimates based on official data.
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FIGURE 5 Reductions in claimant unemployment in Scottish local authorities: comparison between upturns [Colour
figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Source. DWP and authors' estimates based on official data.
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on the scale in each diagram. The point here is not to suggest that these welfare reforms had any impact on earlier
events but simply to examine whether the pattern of change by local authority that can be observed in the
2011–16 period is similar to that in previous upturns.
As will be immediately apparent, there is very strong similarity between the geography of the reduction in
unemployment in all three periods. The places in Scotland that have experienced the biggest percentage point
reduction in JSA unemployment during the recent upturn, which were also the places hit hardest by welfare
reform, are the same places that experienced the biggest reduction in claimant unemployment during previous
upturns. This is a key observation. What it suggests is that the reductions in JSA unemployment cannot be attrib-
uted to welfare reform. Rather, the big reductions in areas of high unemployment are a normal feature of eco-
nomic upturns.
7 | CONCLUSIONS
In the context of the United Kingdom's welfare reform, what emerges is a divergence between expectations and
outcomes. The shortfall in financial savings to theTreasury, to March 2016, is arguably the least concerning of these.
Even though welfare rules and regulations are under the direct control of government, the actual level of spending is
always going to depend in part on factors such as economic growth and inflation which cannot be accurately
predicted. There is also unavoidable uncertainty about how welfare reforms will work out in practice, especially where
there is the possibility of behavioral change. Forecasting the financial savings from welfare reform is an inherently
uncertain activity and we should not be surprised that government sometimes get things wrong. Even so, the margin
by which the reforms to incapacity‐related benefits failed to deliver the expected savings is remarkable.
The uneven impact of welfare reform across the country is more concerning. The suspicion here is that because
the same benefit rules apply everywhere the UK government never gave much thought to how the reforms would
play out in different places. If this was indeed the thinking, it proved to be a serious blind‐spot because in practice
the financial loss in some places has been far greater than in others. Indeed, the evidence indicates that by
and large it is the poorest places that have been hit hardest. There is a certain inevitability in this because if wel-
fare benefits are reduced, the losses will nearly always tend to be concentrated in the places where claimant
rates are highest.
That the poorest places are nearly always hit hardest by welfare reform is an uncomfortable reality that needs to
be logged by government. Welfare reform, an essentially “national” policy, has distinctly uneven regional and local
impacts and tends to work directly against other policy objectives such as the convergence in prosperity and
well‐being across the country. Indeed, because in the poorest places the financial losses from welfare reform are so
large they are often likely to exceed the spending on policies to strengthen local and regional economies. If more
out‐of‐work claimants in disadvantaged areas are to be encouraged to look for work, for example, there is a good case
for boosting regeneration efforts to generate more jobs in these places.
The impact on the labor market points to the biggest gap between expectations and outcomes. We need to be
clear that the evidence here comes from an exploratory study covering Scotland and that the impact of welfare reform
on the labor market is something that deserves much more research. However, if the tentative conclusions from
Scotland can be generalized to the rest of Britain there is little evidence that the welfare reforms have delivered lower
numbers on benefit and higher numbers in employment. If this is indeed the case and positive labor market outcomes
have not in practice been delivered, it indicates that the United Kingdom's welfare reforms need to be understood first
and foremost as being about reducing public spending.
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ENDNOTES
1 RPI is the Retail Price Index; CPI is the Consumer Price Index.
2 The Office for Budget Responsibility (2016) puts the reduction in welfare spending attributable to the changeover at £5.2
billion a year, including the impact on state pensions.
3 The difference between the Treasury's estimate of savings in 2014–15 and the financial loss to households in 2015–16
from data assembled from local authorities by the New Policy Institute.
4 Based on DWP estimates of the number of households originally expected to be affected in Scotland and the average
financial loss.
5 Source: DWP.
6 Including Universal Credit claimants looking for work.
7 Three outliers have been excluded from the figures shown for 1998–2004. These are Eilean Siar, Highland, and
Inverclyde.
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APPENDIX
DETAILS OF REFORMS, DATA SOURCES, AND METHODS
Housing Benefit: Local Housing Allowance
• Rents set at 30th percentile of local rents, rather than 50th percentile, from 2011–12
• Caps on maximum rents by property size, with 4‐bed limit, from 2011–12
• Abolition of £15 excess for tenants below maximum rent, from 2011–12
• Age limit for shared accommodation rate raised from 25 to 35, from January 2012
• Switch to CPI indexation, from 2013–14
Financial losses
Initial forecast: Budget 2010, Spending Review 2010 and DWP Housing Benefit: changes to the Local Housing
Allowance arrangements
Estimated outturn: Budget 2011, Budget 2012, Spending Review 2010 and DWP Housing
Benefit: changes to the Local Housing Allowance arrangements
Allocation to local authorities
Based on DWP data on number of households affected, average loss, and numbers claiming Housing Benefit in
the private rented sector
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Housing Benefit: “bedroom tax”
• Limit payments to working‐age households in social rented sector to reflect new rules on property size, from
2013–14
Financial losses
Initial forecast: Budget 2010
Estimated outturn: Based on number of households affected and average loss in June 2013
Allocation to local authorities
Based on DWP data on number of households affected and average loss in each authority in June 2013
Non‐dependant deductions
• Up‐rating deductions between April 2011 and April 2014 in line with rents and increases in Council Tax since
2001, and subsequent link to prices
Financial losses
Initial forecast: Budget 2010
Estimated outturn: Budget 2011
Allocation to local authorities
Based on DWP data on number of Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit claimants in each local authority
Benefit Cap
• Total payments to out‐of‐work working‐age households capped, from 2013–14
Financial losses
Initial forecast: Spending Review 2010
Estimated outturn: Based on number of households affected and average loss
Allocation to local authorities
Based on DWP data on average number of affected households between November 2013 and April 2014 and
average loss per household in each authority in April 2014
Council Tax Support
• 10% reduction in Treasury grant compared to previous scheme, from 2013–14.
• Reduction in entitlement only permitted for working‐age households
Financial losses
Initial forecast: Based on number of households affected and average weekly loss in 2013
Estimated outturn: Based on number of households affected and average weekly loss in 2016
Allocation to local authorities
Number affected and average weekly loss from statistics for 2013–14 and 2015–16 published by the New
Policy Institute, based on information from each local authority
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Personal Independence Payment
• DLA for working‐age claimants replaced by PIP, from 2013–14
• More stringent medical test and regular re‐testing
• Reduction in number of payment categories
Financial losses
Initial forecast: Budget 2010, adjusted for inflation and revised implementation timetable
Estimated outturn: Budget 2013
Allocation to local authorities
Based on DWP data on number of working age DLA claimants in each local authority
Employment and Support Allowance
• Introduction for new claimants, from October 2008
• Applied to existing incapacity claimants, from autumn 2010 onwards
• Time‐limiting of non‐means‐tested entitlement in Work‐Related Activity Group, from 2012–13
• New conditionality
Financial losses
Initial forecast: Spending Review 2010 revised to take account of inflation and additional numbers expected to
be affected by time‐limiting by 2015–16, plus additional £1,750 million a year from remaining measures
Estimated outturn: Based on outturn data on numbers affected
Allocation to local authorities
Number affected by time‐limiting based on the difference between the proportion of claimants in the
Work‐Related Activity Group receiving contributory benefits in the four quarters to February 2012 and in the
four quarters to May 2015; allocated in proportion to DWP data on the Work‐Related Activity Group in each
local authority. Reduction in ESA caseload based on difference between the average IB/Severe Disablement
Allowance (SDA) caseload in the four quarters to August 2008 and the average combined ESA and residual
IB/SDA caseload in the four quarters to May 2015; allocated in proportion to DWP data on the IB/ESA caseload in
each authority in August 2008. Loss per claimant based on DWP estimate of average loss arising from time‐limiting
Child Benefit
• Freeze benefit rates for three years, from 2011–12
• Withdrawal from households including higher earner, from January 2013
Financial losses
Initial forecast: Budget 2010, Spending Review 2010, Budget 2011, Budget 2012
Estimated outturn: Budget 2012
Allocation to local authorities
Based on HMRC data on number in receipt in each local authority, with adjustment by an index of median
earnings in each local authority relative to the UK average
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Tax Credits
• Adjustments to thresholds, withdrawal rates, supplements, income disregards and backdating provisions, from
2011–12 onwards
• Changes in indexation and up‐rating, from 2011–12 onwards
• Reductions in childcare element of Working Tax Credit, from 2011–12
• Increase in working hours requirement for Working Tax Credit, from 2012–13
Financial losses
Initial forecast: Budget 2010, Spending Review 2010, Autumn Statement 2011
Estimated outturn: Budget 2011, Budget 2012, Budget 2014
Allocation to local authorities
Based on HMRC data on number in receipt in each local authority
1% up‐rating
• 1% up‐rating (instead of CPI) for three years from 2013–14 for main working‐age benefits, and two years from
2014–15 for Child Benefit and Local Housing Allowance
Financial losses
Initial forecast: Autumn Statement 2012
Estimated outturn: Revised to reflect difference between forecast inflation in Autumn Statement 2012 and out-
turn inflation
Allocation to local authorities
Based on DWP and HMRC expenditure data by local authority
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